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Pluralism, Institutionalism and the Theories of BC Politics 
 
 
The best case for connecting history to the social sciences is neither empirical nor 
methodological, but theoretical. 
 
-----Paul Pierson, Politics in Time (2004) 
 
 
Theories of B.C. politics have generally sought to explain the distinctiveness of this 
provincial polity and society.  The concluding sentences of Margaret Ormsby’s 1958 
opus British Columbia: A History, captures this historical distinctiveness quite well:   
 
“The name chosen for the Gold Colony by Queen Victoria seemed to the Duke of 
Newcastle in 1858 to be neither ‘very felicitous’ nor ‘very original’. But one 
hundred years later, ‘British Columbia’  still suggests more aptly than any other 
name could do, the sentiment  and the outlook of the Canadian people who live in 
the furthest west.”1  
 
Ormsby’s description has a post-colonial ring that is jarring to the ears of many 
Canadians half a century later, especially First Nations and New Canadians; nonetheless, 
it does seem to me to capture the essential premise of all theories of B.C. politics: that 
something about the imposition of a British parliamentary and legal system upon the 
frontier political economy and culture beyond the Rockies produced a unique compound.   
   Theories of BC politics have varied somewhat in their characterization of this 
difference, and what it is therefore that they seek to explain.  A   focus on the nature of 
the provincial party system—i.e. why it  was that the two minor parties federally at that 
time, Social Credit and the CCF/NDP, predominated provincially, and why Social Credit 
in particular was dominant—often necessitates a discussion of ideology, political 
economy or political culture, as well as consideration of styles of public policy, 
                                                 
1 Margaret A. Ormsby,  British Columbia: A History  (Toronto: Macmillan of Canada, 1958),  p.495. 
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leadershipt and  conditions of “governance” broadly defined as citizen-state relations.  
The early 1970s particularly produced a burst of scholarship about these questions, much 
of it in the pages of BC Studies. In a series of articles, book reviews and exchanges that 
produced much heat as well as light, Professors Black, Robin, Sproule-Jones, Blake, Ruff 
and Cairns laid out the then-current parameters of thinking about the nature and evolution 
of the provincial state and political behaviour in British Columbia.   
     Today’s readers will find these articles interesting not only as objects of 
historiography, but as points of reference for subsequent developments, both empirical 
and theoretical.  Three theories in particular merit our renewed attention:  Ed Black’s 
“politics of  exploitation,” which stresses the origins of Social Credit in populist protest 
and a desire by various marginalized social groupings, in particular small business, for a 
bigger piece of the wealth generated by resource industries;  Mark Sproule-Jones’ quite 
different formulation of elite-mass theory, which locates Social Credit electoral 
dominance in the state’s ability to control flows of information to the province’s 
hinterland; and Martin Robin’s account of the state and British Columbia’s polarized 
politics as the outcome of a particularly pronounced class struggle, brought about by the 
structures of ownership and conditions of employment in the province’s resource 
industries.  
    Each of these theories needs to be re-examined in the light  of four more decades worth 
of evidence. How has Black’s  characterization of B.C.’s political culture in terms of  
populist and anti-elitist sentiments stood up in the face of massive demographic, 
socioeconomic and technological change?  To what extent do communications 
developments help to explain the rise and fall of Social Credit, and the changes we have 
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observed in the conditions of governance since?  Has the rise of a tertiary sector and the 
service economy, coupled with immigration and globalization, muted the impact of class 
as a determinant of B.C. politics and public policy?  And since theories of B.C. politics 
have been primarily concerned with explaining distinctiveness, (i.e. difference from other 
party systems and political cultures in Canada) could the continuing influence or 
lingering effects of structural determinants such as class, which are declining in absolute 
terms, nonetheless still be counted upon to explain what are still observably unique 
features of the B.C. political system? 
     In  addition to the challenges posed by evidence to traditional theories, are the 
challenges posed by newer theories. Of these, post-materialism is a leading candidate, 
because its central thesis—that political values are becoming essentially less 
materialistic—speaks to the decline of what both the Black and Robin theories argued 
historically made B.C.’s politics unique. And its psychological premise—that increased 
ontological security, coupled with increased human capital and education levels, 
produces a more cognitively mobile citizenry and consequently a more fickle 
electorate—provides a ready account of  the decline of government’s ability to easily 
control the flow of information in the way described by Sproule-Jones—and an 
explanation of, among other things,  the rising importance of environmental and quality 
of life issues, as well the growing  premium placed upon “communications strategy” by 
provincial governments.2 
                                                 
2 Hence the same data that can be used to document the breakdown in the “one-step flow” of information 
described by Sproule-Jones  is used by researchers in the area of value change and the reorientation of 
citizen-state relations, such as Mebs Kanji,  to demonstrate the changing nature of human capital as part of 
the cognitive mobilization argument: See Mebs Kanji, “Political Discontent, Human Capital and 
Representative Governance,’ in Nevitte, Neil, ed., Value Change and Governance in Canada (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press,2002), 71-105. (2002), esp. 82-90. 
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     This article will explore the limitations  of  both economic ‘materialist’ theories  and 
post-materialist cultural value change in explaining the growing complexity, high opacity 
and sporadic contingencies of processes shaping the B.C. political landscape. Building 
upon Alan Cairns’s  early work on  provincial state-building and neo-institutionalism, the 
paper challenges each of the four theories in question.  It finds that the conjunction of 
growing social pluralism with the increasing density of regulations, laws, policies, 
networks  and institutions in B.C. has changed the political  “rules of the game”.  But if 
pluralism, legalism and institutionalization have blunted the primacy of social forces and 
structures privileged by most of these theories, have they also erased the distinctiveness 
of B.C. politics?  Or is that distinctiveness still there, and consistent with a more state-
centred perspective?  It will be suggested that British Columbia is indeed still a unique 
puzzle to be solved, but one which will require more nuanced attention to the historical 
development (e.g. timing, sequence, and inertia) of institutions, as well as to the 
intellectual development (e.g. historical, economic, sociological and discursive) of 
institutionalism in political science.  
 
 
The Explanandum: A Moving Target 
 
     Much of the intellectual interest in B.C. politics has centred upon attempts to 
understand its “party system”— i.e. the prevalent pattern of relationships among parties, 
usually expressed in terms of the number of parties and their relative strength of support 
among the voters.3  . The three classic theories were all written and debated during  either 
the last years of the first Social Credit Government of W.A. C. Bennett, which ruled 
                                                 
3 See Norman Ruff, “Birth Pangs: The Emergence of British Columbia’s Fifth Party System 1991-2000,”  
in  Hugh G. Thorburn, Party Politics in Canada, Prentice-Hall, 8th Edition, 2001, pp.369-380. 
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British Columbia for 20 years, from 1952 to 1972, or during the first New Democratic 
Party  (NDP) Government, led by David Barrett, which lasted from 1972 to 1975.  Hence 
they all  attempt to explain either Social Credit dominance  or, more generally, the 
dominance of the the two minor parties nationally (Social Credit and CCF/NDP)—
although Ed Black’s “politics of exploitation” does take B.C.’s political culture as the 
primary phenomenon to be explained and the nature of the party system as  somewhat 
incidental.  
     The watershed election of 1991—which finally ended the long reign of the Social 
Credit party as B.C. dominant political party—has gradually led to a newly polarized 
two-party system reminiscent of that of the 1980s, except that the centre-right coalition 
that has governed since 2001 now does so under a Liberal banner.  Is this only a nominal 
change, afer all?  Certainly, the convincing win by Gordon Campbell in his 1993 bid for 
the liberal leadership was done with assistance of many former Social Credit supporters; 
the drastic spending cuts and business-friendly policies of the Liberals’ first years in 
office were reminiscent of the Social Credit restraint programme of two decades earlier.  
The central dynamic of B.C. electoral competititon  has remained the same: the 
maintenance of an anti-NDP coalition of the centre-right.  If there has  been a decisive 
shift in the character of the dominant party,  that is reflected in its geographical and 
socio-economic base of support and the style of political leadership that it gives rise to. 
The Campbell Liberals  were arguably Vancouver-based party, and its core supporters 
were the high income earners (business and professional elites) of Greater Vancouver, 
who no longer have to vote for populist politicians with bases in the interior in order to 
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keep the NDP at bay.4  While this shift still carries considerable risk of a right-wing 
splinter party forming and gaining strength, particularly in the interior, it is probably 
significant that none of the main contenders to succeed Gordon Campbell as Liberal 
leader in 2011 mounted a challenge that was conspicuously populist, anti-Vancouver, or 
anti-elite.   
      It can be argued  that this semi-normalization of the party system means that it should 
no longer be the sole or even primary subject of a contemporary theory of B.C. politics. 
The focus upon parties was an understandable pre-occupation of analysts during the 
Social Credit era, when there was so much that was obviously distinctive about the party 
system. In addition,  smaller policy communities and less institutionalized networks of 
governance probably made political parties more important in the middle years of the 
twentieth century, when they functioned as the principal sources of policy and as the 
most important interlocutors between many interests and the state.5  And while the 
politics of resource wealth and  land development still occupy centre stage, the sources of 
polarization today may stem less from the historic demands of  labour, small business and 
the hinterland for a bigger share of the steadily growing prosperity than from a positional 
competition for legal rights to varying kinds of land use and land value under conditions 
of increasing relative scarcity, of both the physical and social kinds.6 That the Land 
Question is still such a question in the twenty-first century is an important aspect of the 
                                                 
4 “The data ...confirm the persistence of the economic and class base of party support that [Donald]Blake  
reported in the  mid-1990s and indeed suggests that the relationship has sharpened. “  Lynda Erickson, 
“Electoral behaviour in British Columbia,” in  Michael Howeltt, Dennis Pilon and Tracy Summerville, eds., 
British Columbia Politics and Government,Emond Montgomery, 2010, p.141. 
5 “[T]he formalization of lines of communication between interest groups and government has reduced the 
importance of political parties as the principal conduits of interest articulation, interest aggregation, and 
policy formulation.” Mark Crawford, “New Governance: NGO and Interest Group Activities in British 
Columbia,” in Howlett et al , ibid, p.184. 
6 For a discussion of positionality, social scarcity and their relation to land, see Fred Hirsch, Social Limits 
to Growth, Harvard University Press, 1976, 1999. 
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continuing distinctiveness of the province’s politics, and of the elevation of the provincial 
state itself—its rights, rules, regulations and entitlements-- into a zone of contestation.   
Some of these fault lines can cut across party lines, as Campbell’s belated embracing of  
the New Relationship with First Nations and the Climate Action Plan illustrate. Other 
issues will no doubt serve to reinforce longstanding class and geographic differences in 
the electorate, along with differences in party support.   
      A word of skepticism is probably also warranted with respect to the apparent de-
centring of the party system and party politics as a whole.  While a number of trends such 
as declining voter turnout and growing voter volatility alongside the growing size, 
number and legal definition of policy networks are all clear and well-documented, their 
over-all import is not.  As a recent survey of developments in the forestry sector 
admitted, “doubts about whether there is anything especially new about new 
environmental governance and whether it can deliver sustainability in forestry or in any 
other natural resource and environmental policy sector remain unresolved.”7 Other 
studies point to  disjunctures between ideas and interests and conflict between core policy 
networks and broader policy communities.8 It remains open for important interest 
groups, along with broad swathes of the electorate, to decide that ‘real change’ lies in the 
ballot box, after all. 
 
                                                 
7 Michael Howlett, Jeremy Rayner, and Chris Tollefson, “From Old to New Dynamics in Canadian Forest 
Policy: Dynamics Without Change?”, in  Debora Van Nijnatten and Robert Boardman, eds. Canadian 
Environmental Policy and Politics (Toronto: Oxford Univesity Press). 
8 See, for example, Melody Hessing, Michael Howlett, and Tracy Summerville, eds,  Canadian Natural 
Resource and Environmental Policy, second edition (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2005). 
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     What has been crystal clear is the growing size, complexity, and capacity of the 
provincial state over the past half-century, which has consequently merited increasing 
analytical attention as an independent variable and not just as a dependent variable  
shaped by social structures and processes.  The critique by Edwin Black and Alan Cairns 
of centralist views of Canadian federalism that neglected the importance of the provincial 
state9 was carried over into Cairns’s  trenchant appraisal of studies of provincial politics 
in 1972.10 The concept of “province-building”  was in turn clearly related to the more 
general critique of sociological approaches articulated by Cairns in his presidential 
address to the Canadian Political Science Association in 1977.11 “The significant 
question, after all, is the survival of provincial governments, not of provincial societies, 
and it is not self-evident that the existence and support of the latter is necessary to the 
functioning and aggrandisement of the former. Their sources of survival, renewal, and 
vitality may well lie within themselves and in their capacity to mould their environment 
in accordance with their own governmental purposes.”12  A crucial question for theories 
of B.C. politics is whether they treat that growing capacity of the state as an element of 
the distinctiveness they are trying to explain; or  whether they treat  that distinctiveness 
merely as “the historic residue of the cleavages of yesteryear.”13 
 
                                                 
9 Edwin R. Black and Alan C. Cairns, “A Different Perspective on Canadian Federalism,”  Canadian 
Public Administration 9 (1966),  27-44. 
10 “The contradiction between the centralist bias of most English-Canadian interpretations and the 
decentralist reality of contemporary Canada requires a counter literature  which explains the survival of the 
provinces, their present importance, and the manner of their functioning. Our knowledge of these matters is 
a shambles of confusion and contradiction.” Alan C. Cairns, “The Study of the Provinces: A Review 
Article,” B.C. Studies 14 (1972), 73-82 at 75. 
 
11 Alan C. Cairns, “Governments and Societies of  Canadian Federalism,” Canadian Journal of Political 
Science, 10 (1977), 695-725. 
12 Ibid., p.145. 
13 Ibid. 
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Social Class as the Basis of B.C. Politics: Continuing but Declining Importance? 
 
     Martin Robin’s thesis, that class structure and class conflict were the most important 
factors distinguishing  B.C. politics,  first appeared in a short essay on B.C.political 
parties in ,the Queen’s Quarterly in 196614, and was later developed in more depth  in his 
two volume political history of British Columbia, The Company Province.15 He also 
wrote a chapter  for a book which he edited on Canadian provincial politics16.  Of 
particular interest are the sections in all three publications in which Robin develops 
linkages between economy (resource base and industry), social structure, and political 
and partisan conflict.      In Robin’s account,   the British Columbia anomaly (“in no other 
province are the two federal minor parties—Social Credit and New Democratic—major 
parties in the legislature”) “derives in part  from the peculiar nature of the coast social 
structure,” in which “extreme social cleavages, based primarily on class differences” 
inhibited the rise of consensus politics.17  The particular character of these cleavages---a 
stronger, more organized and more militant labour movement pitted against Robber 
Baron  industrialists, and a more dispersed and variegated  cadre of farmers and small 
businessmen both opposed to socialism and resentful of corporate and financial centres in 
Vancouver and in the east—was in turn rooted in an industrial economic structure very 
different from that of the prairies and distinguishable from the industrial manufacturing 
bases of Ontario and Quebec. In British Columbia,  the  central role of primary resource 
                                                 
14 “The Social Basis of Party Politics in British Columbia,” Queen’s Quarterly, 72(1966), reprinted in 
Hugh Thorburn (ed.), Party Politcs in Canada, 2nd ed.,,(Scarborough, Ont.: Prentice-Hall, 1967). 
15 The Rush for the Spoils: The Company Province 1871-1933 (Toronto: McLelland-Stewart, 1972); 
Pillars of Profit: The Company Province 1934-72. (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1973). 
16 “British Columbia: The Company Province,” in Martin Robin (ed.), Canadian Provincial Politics: The 
Party Systems of the Ten Provinces, second edition (Scarborough, Ont: Prentice Hall, 1978.  
17 “Social Basis”, p.201. 
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extraction industries made it a corporate frontier and a company province: “the large 
enterprise, rather than the small family homestead, is the dominant shape of the social  
landscape.”18 
      Although Robin acknowledged that “[i]t is difficult to say which cleavage, class or 
regional, is more critical in determining the structure of British Columbia politics, ”19 
he leaves  little doubt that class struggle is the more important factor in explaining the 
distinctiveness of that structure in comparison with other provinces and regions of 
Canada.  Large-scale production in the timber and mining industries ensured the 
predominance of industrial unionism within the provincial labour movement, and 
attracted militant unionists and organizers to settle in B.C.: 
 
 Thee British Workingmen who first led the unions and worked the coal  
mines of Vancouver Island were not the highly skilled and exclusive  
artisans who dominated the trade assemblies of Ontario during the 1880s.  
They were men from the north of England who brought to Canada  
organizational skill and a marked propensity toward independent politics 
charateristic of the English and Scottish northern mining communities.  
Equally militant were the many American workers who provided the early 
constituency of  radical unions like the  Western Federation of Miners.  
 ...The question of labor’s political political action, together with a host  
of issues arising from working-class participation, form enduring themes  
of the British Columbia political culture.20 
 
Robin pointed out that in 1966 the British Columbia labour movement was the most 
highly organized and most strike prone in the country. 42.7 percent of the paid labour 
force was unionized, as opposed to less than 33 percent nationwide;  between 1949 and 
1959 the 10 percent of Canada’s  nonagricultural workforce that inhabited British 
                                                 
18 Canadian Provincial Politics, p. 29. 
19 Ibid.,  p.36. 
20 Ibid., pp.29-30. 
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Columbia  was responsible for 15% of the labour stoppages.21  The ratio of industrial 
unionism  to craft business unionism was the highest in the country. Other factors 
contributing to labour militancy were the closed nature of single-industry resource 
communities with small or non-existent middle classes, coupled with seasonal and 
cyclical unemployment and unstable markets, all serving to reinforce working class 
insecurity and to intensify working class consciousness.22   
     The most important consequence of these characteristics for provincial politics was 
the involvement of  organized labour in the electoral arena—initially with socialist and 
independent labour candidates, the Socialist Party of Canada (which in 1912 briefly 
formed the Official Opposition in the Legislature) and eventually the  Cooperative 
Commonwealth Federation (CCF) and the NDP.  Robin rightly stresses the unique social 
basis of the CCF/NDP in British Columbia, however: whereas on the prairies farm 
movements had been relatively militant, class conscious and cohesive compared to labour 
movements, in British Columbia that situation was reversed. Moreover, the smaller size, 
variegated nature and comparative affluence  of the agrarian sector in B.C. made it less 
receptive to agrarian radicalism, even during the Depression years,  and more suitable as 
a base for Social Credit support.23  The Social Credit Party drew its support and 
leadership disproportionately from “self-employed old middle classes”, both urban and 
rural, who could wage popular battles against socialism without being too closely 
identified with the Vancouver–based economic elite.24 
                                                 
21 “Social Basis,” 203. 
22 Robin actually could have buttressed point about the strength  of class consciousness  even further  by 
documenting the flourishing of a distinctive working class culture—for example the folk songs, poetry, 
church groups and social activism that developed in the coal-mining industry on Vancouver Island in the 
mid-to late nineteenth century—much of it oriented toward class struggle and promoting solidarity. 
23 “Social Basis,”pp.204-205. 
24 Ibid. 206-211. 
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     While  B.C. ‘s economic structure centred on primary resource extraction, particularly 
timber and minerals, throughout the twentieth century, it was  also altered by the rise of 
new industries and markets.  Philip Resnick’s article on “B.C. Capitalism and the Empire 
of the Pacific” picked up on a latent theme in the historical literature—B.C.’s economic 
role as the gateway to the Pacific—and correctly predicted its growing importance in the 
future (although in the mid-1980s he naturally placed greater emphasis upon Japanese 
growth and influence than on China’s). A “new international division of labour” was 
emerging, in which trade and commerce were shifting decisively from the Atlantic 
Region to the Pacific region, and in which “Canada will continue to enjoy a kind of semi-
peripheral status,” with a continuing reliance upon resource exports. 25 A shift in the 
provincial social and economic structure accompanied  Vancouver’s growing status as a 
hub for all of Western Canada: “Vancouver, moreover, has developed an extensive 
tertiary sector, typical of a managerial-service centre within the international capitalist 
chain, rather than of a strictly industrial city.”26 
     We  have witnessed the persistent importance of resource industries in the “economic 
base”, since the “only unambiguous category of final demands  is exports—and exports 
are dominated by the products of natural resource-based industries”.27 On the other hand, 
several economists over the years have commented upon the growth of the services 
sector, which accounted for 80% of the employment growth in the province between 
1961 and 199128. Some analysts even went  so far as to say that its dramatic expansion in 
the 1980s and 1990s was “clearly driving a fundamental restructuring of British 
                                                 
25 Philip Resnick, “B.C. Capitalism and the Empire of the Pacific,” BC Studies (Autumn 1985), 29-46. 
26 Ibid., 43. 
27 Ronald A. Shearer “The Economy,” B.C Studies, no. 100 (Winter 1993-94), p.131. 
28 Ibid.,  p.132. 
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Columbia’s economy,” resulting in  the uncoupling of Vancouver from the resource-
based hinterland. 29  
     Whatever the remaining importance of resource extraction for provincial growth and 
government revenues, however, the era of “electoral class struggle” appears to be 
diminishing, as today’s politics revolve increasingly around the new “post-staples” 
service political economy. It is very significant that B.C.’s union density, once the 
highest of any jurisdiction in North America, has fallen to about 30%, or just over the 
national average.30 Strike activity was no longer routinely the highest in Canada, or even 
in  English Canada, buy the mid-1980s.31 Large-scale expansion of the public sector in 
the latter half of the twentieth century meant that by 1998 union membership in the public 
sector was four times greater than that of the private sector; growth of the service 
economy was also spurred by increased contracting out and commercialization of 
domestic services.32  
     The NDP has aligned itself with the new service sector workforce, which are either in 
the public sector or else depend heavily on government spending, labour legislation and 
employment standards. The Liberals have attempted to mediate “the tensions between the 
resource hinterland and the service-based urban economy” by promising prosperity 
through the protection of corporate interests and delivering privatization, deregulation 
                                                 
29 T.A. Hutton and H.C. Davis, Toward a Service Sector Strategy for  British Columbia: Policy Context, 
Objectives, Models and Programs. Victoria: British ColumbiaRound Table on the Environment and the 
Economy, 1992; Roger Hayter and Trevor Barnes,”Innis’ staple theory, exports and recession: British 
Columbia, 1981-86,” Economic Geography 66: 150-73 (1990). 
30  Statistics Canada. “Unionization.” Perspectives on Labour and Income, August: 1-8. (2007). 
31 Robert Allen, “Province’s proposed new labor law solves a problem that doesn’t exist,” The Vancouver 
Sun, April 10, 1987. 
32 Keith Brownsey, Michael Howlett, Joshua Newman, “From Forestry to Film: The Changing Political 
economy of British Columbia,” in  Michael Howlett, Dennis Pilon and Tracy Summerville, eds., British 
Columbia Politics and Government,Emond Montgomery, 2010, pp.23-24. 
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and tax restraint to middle class professionals and businesses.  The Liberals were able to 
“disrupt the traditional class division of  electoral politics in British Columbia”  by 
increased spending on infrastructure and by pursuing a more progressive social agenda 
(First Nations, Climate Change , less privatization) in its second term.33 The present 
governing coalition must try to prevent  conservatives and interior supporters from 
splitting off,  while at the same time be seen as sufficiently progressive to undercut the 
opposition; the NDP must strive to broaden its coalition so as to expand  beyond its old 
blue collar industrial base without  becoming  too strongly identified with just public 
sector workers.  While there are still strong echoes of old class and regional antagonisms, 
the interests in play are now too complex to be  portrayed as simply emanating from  the 
industrial base and  being reflected in the politics of the superstructure. 
     There is an additional twist to the economics, and hence the politics,  accompanying 
the decline of  resource-led growth, which was highlighted by UBC economist Robert C. 
Allen in 1986. Criticizing former premier William Bennett’s premise that deteriorating 
terms of trade necessitated a boost in exports in order to maintain B.C. ‘s standard of 
living,  (as well as  the argument that politicians of all stripes had made that it was 
necessary for B.C. to boost secondary manufacturing), Allen pointed out that the  average 
income of British Columbians had not depended on the level of provincial exports or the 
rate of extensive growth (total growth, along with a larger population) for most of the 
twentieth century. Instead, it depended upon intensive growth (i.e. growth in output per 
capita) which was not as dependent upon resource or manufacturing exports.34   
                                                 
33 Ibid., p. 26.. 
34 Robert C. Allen: “The B.C. Economy: Past, Present, and Future,” in R.C. Allen and G. Rosenbluth, 
Restraining the Economy: Social Credit Economic Policies for B.C. in the Eighties. Vancouver: New Star 
Books, 1986, 9-42. 
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The jump from”primary” to “tertiary” (service ) economy that has become manifest 
during the past quarter-century ought to facilitate the acceptance of Allen’s recommended 
goal of raising average incomes as opposed to total growth, but for one problem: the  
power of several organized interests (developers, landowners and those service 
businesses and some private sector unions who benefit disproportionately from a growing 
total population and economy). Allen even offered an intriguing economic explanation 
for “polarized politics” in B.C. : most resource rents remained uncollected by 
government, thereby encouraging attempts by each side (employers and unions) to use 
the state to boost its bargaining power so as to collect more of  the economic surplus.35  
This observation supported the general thesis that “class counts”, but revealed the 
provincial state as more complicit (constitutive) in spawning and perpetuating the conflict 
than class-based analysis had  previously allowed for. 
     Notwithstanding these developments, both empirical and theoretical, that limit the 
explanatory power of Robin’s theory today, there is another aspect that indicates and 
explains its continuing relevance.  Robin rightly placed great stress on the comparative 
weakness of extant social and political structures at the time that B.C.’s  industrial 
economy, and concomitant labour relations, took shape.  British Columbia society 
developed as a “corporate frontier”  : 
 
Unlike all other provinces in Canada, socialism settled on the ground  
floor of industrial development in the coast province and socialist politicians  claimed 
the affiliations of  large blocs of unionists at the very beginning of  
growth of the organized labour movement. In Ontario, the only other province where the 
                                                 
35 Ibid., 26-27. Since  the goal of maximizing “average income” is more consistent with quality of life and 
environmental sustainability than simply maximizing total output (which is more lucrative for developers 
and landowners), this distinction should have continuing relevance for policy debates in the future. 
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NDP has a moderately strong urban and working class base, socialist organization 
appeared after the working class and trade unions had been disciplined electorally and 
ideologically by the elite dominated Liberal and Conservative parties. The socialists had 
to break down an established structure of political loyalties. Their task was considerably 
less onerous in British Columbia where a weakly developed party system, structurally 
generated class conflict, and a traditionally radical  working class population 
concentrated in key industrial constituencies, combine to facilitate early radical political 
representation.36 
 
Contemporary historical and sociological institutionalists will recognize  in Robin’s vivid 
descriptions the importance of institutional origins and conjunctures of different social 
processes giving rise to unique patterns and dynamics of institutional development that 
proved to be self-reinforcing.  In the case of British Columbia, a different sequencing of  
labour organization and political institutionalization than was to be found elsewhere 
provided more room for  “ideas and interests  [that were] not only learned in interaction, 
but sustained by it”, in Alexander Wendt’s words.37 As with path-dependent processes 
more generally, political choices in B.C.  became more constrained as reinforcement set 
in. At least partly as a result, a degree of polarized politics has endured, despite declining 
union density and growing social complexity.  
 
The Politics of Exploitation 
 
     Another major interpetation of B.C. politics that surfaced in the late 1960s was that of 
Edwin R. Black, who proposed that British Columbia’s “governmental way of life” was 
best characterized as  “The Politics of Exploitation.”38 The purpose of this phrase was to 
direct readers’ attention to 1) “[t]he great provincial preoccupation with economic 
                                                 
36 “Social Basis,” p.203. 
37 Social Theory of International Relations, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999). 
38 Black, Edwin R.  “British Columbia: The Politics of Exploitation,” in R. Shearer, ed.,  Exploiting Our 
Economic Potential: Public Policy and the British Columbia Economy ,Toronto: Holt Rhineholt Winston, 
1968, 23-41. Reprinted in Hugh G. Thorburn, Party Politics in Canada, Prentice-Hall, 3rd Edition, 1972, 
pp.225-236. 
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development as the most important question of provincial politics;” and 2)  “the peculiar 
context and the particular processes within and through which are made those 
governmental decisions affecting the utilization of natural resources.”39  Like Robin, 
Black explains the materialism of B.C.’s political culture in terms of its character as a 
continuously evolving “frontier”— “with a frontier population, a frontier economy, and a 
frontier type of politics.”40  But Black also stresses factors constraining government 
decision other than class structure, such as high rates of immigration. “Immigration has 
always been a big factor in British Columbia’s growth, and very rarely has has the 
number of native-born exceeded the number of immigrants.”41 
     There were several  cultural consequences of an immigrant population that were found 
by Black to be  politically significant.  A population in flux inhibited the growth of 
incipient local custom, while the generally materialist motivations for moving to B.C. in 
the first place further reinforced attitudes shaped by both economic opportunity and 
vulnerability.  Lack of traditionalism, political uncertainty and instability gave rise to 
weak party loyalties and a weak party system, as evidenced by the fact that B.C. did not 
even have a government formed along party lines until 1902.  From 1902 to 1941 
successive Conservative and Liberal governments had “personality leaders”  who had to 
justify federal party connections in terms of whatever concessions could be wrung out of 
Ottawa—and their ability to stave off the rising threat of a CCF government.  When the 
wartime coalition broke down and  the watershed election of 1952 gave the province two 
new major parties, each of those parties attempted to exploit surviving non-partisan 
                                                 
39 Ibid., 1972, p.225. 
40 Ibid., 226. 
41 Ibid., 227. 
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feeling by emphasizing their character as a popular “movement” rather than as a party.42 
     Social Credit, in particular, showed a remarkable ability to channel popular protest 
against social elites, even after many years in government.  The key to making this 
“institutionalized protest” work was, of course, the “one-man government” style and 
personality of the premier, W.A.C. Bennett.   A corollary of the lack of respect for 
established elites was a lack of respect for “their” institutions or the “niceties of their 
parliamentary procedures”43 and an affinity for “government that gets things done.”44    
The events  surrounding the 1960 and 1963 B.C. provincial elections demonstrated all of 
these  elements of  materialism, activism, personalized leadership and institutionalized 
protest quite well.45 Bennett had campaigned vigorously against the CCF’s plans to 
nationalize the B.C. Electric Company in the fall 1960 election campaign, calling it 
“socialism” and bad for the investment climate in the province. But in the summer of 
1961 he reversed this position and announced the expropriation of B.C. Electric in order 
to achieve the government’s ambitious plans for the development of the province’s hydro 
potential.  
      In the ensuing campaign, the much-heralded new Conservative leader, former  World 
War II commander, federal cabinet minister, lawyer and Rhodes scholar  E. Davie Fulton, 
who had been buoyed by the Conservatives’  strong second-place finish in the Columbia 
by-election in the summer, seized upon the nationalization issue,  insisting that B.C. 
Hydro was legally non-existent. Meanwhile the NDP Opposition tried to portray a new 
and more responsible image to contrast with both the  arbitrary and footloose Socreds and 
                                                 
42 Ibid. 
43 Ibid., 228. 
44 “The Government That Gets Things Done” was a Social Credit campaign slogan . 
45 These events aree just touched upon in Black’s article. I rely upon Walter D. Young, “British 
Columbia,” in Canadian Annual Review, 1963, and newspaper accounts as well. 
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its own more radical past. All Opposition leaders  argued that the cheque giving B.C. 
Electric fair value was in any case worthless without legislative approval.  Meanwhile, 
Highways Minister,  the Rev. “Flying Phil” Gagliardi, who had been on the defensive 
because of allegations of  kickbacks in his ministry,  had to fight Fulton in their mutual 
home riding of Kamloops.   
     The Vancouver Province congratulated The Opposition leader, Mr. Bruce Strachan, 
for his more restrained style and “frankness, dignity and statesmanlike approach to 
provincial problems.” Vancouver Sun editor-in-chief, Bruce Hutchinson, gushed that 
“Mr. Fulton towered over all other party leaders.”46 In contrast, Social Credit Ads urged 
British Columbian voters to “Keep B.C. Moving” and to “Elect that Government that 
Gets Things Done.”  The result:  Fulton was trounced by Gagliardi  in Kamloops, and the 
Socreds (to the surprise of many commentators) were returned with an increased 
majority, raising their share of  the popular vote by 2%  (to 41%), and even making 
considerable inroads into NDP working class support in several ridings.47 
     Just as the politics of B.C. Hydro’s creation exemplified  activism, materialism and 
anti-elitism in the political culture,  it also exemplified Black’s characterization of 
economic policy  under Social Credit as “state capitalism”.   Whereas socialists try to use 
the state to break down concentrations of private economic power in order to realize 
democratic values, state capitalists like W.A.C. Bennett  viewed government enterprise 
more instrumentally as a means of stimulating economic development and private 
opportunity— especially for the small entrepreneurs who owned and operated their own 
businesses, and who represented the core of  Social Credit support.  Unfortunately, 
                                                 
46 Vancouver Sun, editorial  September 28, 1963. 
47 Young, op.cit., 141. 
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however, open competition in most resource sectors resulted in  the growth of big 
integrated development companies, creating a “cruel dilemma” for   the Socreds: “The 
Premier and his ministers are forced to create and maintain favourable conditions for 
larger corporate enterprise, while all the time trying to remain free of its clutches and 
satisfy their supporters’ demands that life be made better for the “little fellow”.48 An 
improved system of rail and highway transportation (and the thousands of jobs created in 
their construction), the encouragement of local entrepreneurs as well as foreign investors 
to balance the interests of  the giant corporations, the encouragement of widespread 
property and home ownership, and initiatives such as the creation of the Bank of British 
Columbia, were all indicative of the Socred approach to spreading the benefits of 
capitalism as widely as possible. When combined with well-placed fed-bashing and 
socialist fear mongering, it proved to be a potent formula. 
 
      So what has changed since the collapse of Social Credit and the pre-1991 party 
system? Paradoxically, the Asian immigration of recent decades may have helped to 
maintain traditional levels of materialism, but that materialism is no longer as directly 
connected with the resource wealth of the province. This, coupled with  the growth of the 
service  and knowledge economy centred in Vancouver and the retreat from the province-
building strategy centred upon resource development in the hinterland, has created a new 
political geography.49  Furthermore, the electorate’s penchant for activism and 
personality leadership has declined, or, more precisely, come into conflict with the 
                                                 
48 Black, op.cit., 234. 
49 Tracy Summerville, “The Political Geogrpahy of British Columbia,” in in  Michael Howeltt, Dennis 
Pilon and Tracy Summerville, eds., British Columbia Politics and Government,Emond Montgomery, 2010, 
ch.5. 
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growing institutional density of political life.50  Formal institutions, legally-binding 
rules,  and public policies are more numerous and more entrenched. They are further 
reinforced by widespread proceduralism and rights-consciousness on the part of citizens, 
as well as a growing number of officially recognized groups and interests in society that 
are organized into institutionalized networks.  Modern leaders can still successfully 
appeal to the materialism and populism of B.C. voters, but it is sheer folly to do so with 
the kind of expediency, spontaneity and disdain and disregard for rules, traditions and 
procedures that was common in W.A.C. Bennett’s day.    
     Recent history has furnished two spectacular examples that illustrate this point 
perfectly. William Vander Zalm and Glen Clark both displayed classic political skills and 
dynamic personalized leadership in the great tradition of  colourful B.C. premiers, but ran 
afoul of a less forgiving cultural and legal/institutional environment. Several books have 
been written about the accident-prone and scandal-ridden Vander Zalm years; it will 
suffice to mention four subject areas that relate both to  his pre-election commitments and 
to the politics of exploitation: industrial relations; parliamentary government; financial 
management; and conflict-of-interest. Despite a pre-election commitment to create a 
premier’s economic development council within which a more co-operative labour 
relations climate might develop, Vander Zalm endeavoured to introduce some 
amendments to the province’s labour code (Bill 19) as soon as possible after the election. 
In what Graham Leslie, the author and former deputy minister of labour  described as 
“the first betrayal,”  Bill 19  significantly eroded the bargaining power of unions, 
inflaming an already rocky industrial relations climate. It was produced by two private 
sector lawyers “with exclusively management backgrounds,” and introduced in a way 
                                                 
50 See Pierson, op cit., 31, 34-36. 
 22
that “deliberately ignored”  “even the simplest checks and balances available to the 
government,” such as consideration by cabinet and/or a cabinet committee.51  
     The true costs and benefits of the Expo lands sale and the Coquihalla Highway project 
became major subjects of media inquiry and opposition criticism, leading to the 
establishment of  a commission of inquiry which found evidence of financial 
reporting”tainted with an atmosphere of deceit and prevarication by both politicians and 
public servants.”52The aptly-acronymed Budget Stabilization (BS) Fund, while not 
illegal  and arguably within the Social Credit tradition of  financial accounting innovation 
concerning “perceptions about funding availability”, created considerable confusion and 
derision among MLAs, media and the general public. Last but not least, was the 
premier’s insistence that, once the formality of transferring ownership of Fantasy 
Garden’s into his wife’s name was complete, he could continue promoting “Lillian’s 
place” while acting as premier.53 It was a dance with impropriety redolent of Gagliardi’s 
tenure as Minister of Highways, but after his receipt of a wad of $100 bills in the early 
hours of August 4, 1990, it ultimately sealed his fate and led to his resignation. 
      The case of NDP premier Glen Clark’s fall from grace is perhaps an even better 
illustration of the point that the legal and political context haschanged incontrovertibly 
since the postwar era.  For Premier Clark ran into trouble even though, like W.A.C. 
Bennett, he was not out of his depth on the issues, as Vander Zalm clearly was in the 
1986 forestry negotiations, the Meech Lake negotiations, the South Moresby, and the 
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Publishing, 1991), pp. 52-54. 
52 Ibid., 194-195. 
53 Gary Mason and Keith Baldrey, Fantasyland: Inside the Government of Bill Vander Zalm (1989). 
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Expo lands sale, to name just a few.54  In contrast, Clark’s political judgements often 
displayed Bennett- like courage and acuity. When he displayed  extreme action 
orientation—in stark contrast to Harcourt—he  did enjoy brief spikes in popularity, as 
when he defused the well-laid Liberal trap of the BC Hydro scandal by promptly firing 
two senior Hydro executives right after assuming office. Clark also took rapid action in 
several social program areas, and certainly showed workers in the fishing and 
shipbuilding industries that he was determined to “get things done” for them as well, as 
when he threatened to close the Nanoose Bay torpedo–testing range, and determinedly 
circumvented all bureaucratic obstacles to the building of the fast ferries.  “Process is for 
cheese”  was a phrase used to announce the Clark government’s new action orientation in 
1996. It was also revealed to be an anachronism, both in  an Auditor General’s report on 
the Fast  Ferries Project, which was found to have contravened sound principles of 
project management, and in a criminal court decision concerning Glen Clark’s alleged 
breach of trust stemming from his involvement with a friend and neighbour who stood to 
benefit from the conferral of a gambling licence. (Although cleared of all charges, 
Madame Justice Elizabeth Bennett did say that Clark’s  actions constituted “an act of 
folly”.) 
     The “chickens coming home to roost” for these two premiers  reflected the changed 
context of policy-making. On the one hand, the continuing salience of traditional 
economic and populist value preferences is borne out by the ascension of both Vander 
Zalm and Clark to the leadership of their respective parties, their subsequent electoral 
victories, and the undoubted popularity of some of their decisions.  On the other hand,  
both leaders collided with   the twin forces of (1) declining deference, rights 
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consciousness and increasing demands for information, consultation, and participation on 
the part of citizens; and (2) legal and procedural constraints on action that were more 
pronounced than they had been a generation earlier. 
 
 
“Sponsored Conceptual Ideology”  
 
     Mark Sproule-Jones provided a third attempt to explain  the long-run success of the 
Social Credit Party in a more satisfactory way than either the class or “anti-elitist” 
approaches to voting behaviour. He regressed party preferences as expressed in the 1960 
Statement of Votes against the 1961 Census list of the population according to 
occupational categories, and found that there were only a relatively small number of 
statistically significant relationships, suggesting that Robin’s thesis about a deep class 
cleavage shaping the pattern of provincial voting was suspect.55 As for the “anti-elitist”  
interpretation of voting behaviour—the thesis attributed to Edwin Black that Social 
Credit support was distinguished by its animosity toward established social elites—
Sproule-Jones found that of the relevant demographic (“unorganized ranks of the lower 
class and lower middle class groups, and...small and medium-sized businessmen”), only 
small and medium-sized businessmen (or “self-employed”)  showed a positive and 
statistically significant preference for Social Credit (although the negative repulsion of 
professionals  was also found to be consistent  with Black’s thesis). 56  This data was 
deemed insufficient to prove the validity of Black’s theory, since  the party would have 
needed a more generalized appeal to win elections so consistently. 
                                                 
55 “[I]t was only one of the occupational categories, that of “transport and communicationi, craftsmen, 
production process and related workers” ...that distributed itself consistently for one party (the CCF) and 
against all others.”  Mark Sproule-Jones, “Social Credit and the British Columbia electorate.” B.C. Studies 
12: 34-35 W ’71-72; 11:37-50 F ’71, p.37 (1971). 
56 Ibid., p.41. 
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     Sproule-Jones’s alternative interpretation of the data was that from the mid -1950s to 
the early 1970s  Social Credit dominance was secured as a result of two basic processes: 
(1) a large proportion of the electorate came to “identify” with the party at the provincial 
level; and (2) the party had a net partisan advantage in pulling weaker identified NDP, 
Liberal and Tory voters as well as independent voters to their cause at election time. The 
Social Credit Party  consistently defined issue alternatives  in ideological terms, as a 
battle between “free enterprise” and “socialism”. This sponsored ideology was of the 
“conceptual” type, “in that voters were asked to evaluate all political objects in terms of 
this one dimensional ordering.”57  The reason for the particular effectiveness of this 
“sponsored conceptual ideology” in British Columbia?  The very weakness of 
“intermediate structures of interest group influence” (with the possible exception of trade 
union influence on its members) meant that the usual “two-step flow of influence” from 
partisan appeals through the norms of the mediating groups to the electorate found in 
most advanced electoral democracies was largely absent.  Instead, the B.C. electorate 
experienced a “one-step flow” of information coming from the political parties, with 
most of the weakly identified partisans migrating to the ruling Party, which had the 
loudest and clearest voice. 
     Although Sproule-Jones was careful to say that his was an “interpretation” and not a 
full-blown theoretical explanation58, he drew sharp replies from Black and Robin, who 
both argued that his approach was no more supported by the data than was theirs.59 Their 
complaints  received considerable methodological support  from Donald Blake, who 
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pointed out that Sproule-Jones’s regression analysis did not produce coefficients that 
indicated precisely what percentage  of the variance in party support was produced by 
occupational differences;  and did not compare the role of social class (Robin’s key 
variable) or social status (that attributed to  Black) in explaining partisan choice to other 
social characteristics such as religion, ethnic origin or rual/urban residence.60  
     Nonetheless, Sproule-Jones’ analysis did represent a theoretical advance, particularly 
from the perspective of modern institutionalism,61 because  it directed our attention to 
the agency and structuring influence of the state as well as to that of mediating structures 
of interest groups and their communicative behaviours.  Robin had stressed the 
importance of a lack of established structure of political loyalties to the grounding of 
working class consciousness in British Columbia; Black had adverted to the traditionless 
materialism of a population in constant flux.  Both views were well-founded and to a 
degree complementary. But both (especially Robin) saw the state as influenced more than 
influencing. 
     There is a need  to explain why the discursive  or communicative  dominance 
identified by Sproule-Jones was not as evident either before or after the post-war 
period.One  specific hypothesis that springs to mind as a result of his thesis of sponsored 
conceptual ideology is that W.A.C. Bennett seized the potential for political domination 
at a time when provincial state capacity to control communications and to shape 
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61 See Vivien Schmidt, “Give Peace a Chance: Reconciling the Four (Not Three) New Institutionalisms,” 
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discourse was developing faster than either the communicative networks of civil society  
or the  configuration of interest groups in civil society.  Prior to this period, a relatively 
small and weakly developed system of state institutions and laws strongly reflected their  
socially constituted and culturally framed origins in a post-colonial frontier political 
economy and could not overcome local parochialisms. During the W.A.C. Bennett era, 
the governing party could take advantage of  the new province-wide frame of reference.  
After the W.A.C. Bennett era, in the late twentieth century, this newfound hegemony was 
dissipated, even after Social Credit regained power for an extended period (1975-1991).   
     The reasons were at least threefold. First, the impacts of  further developments in 
communications and transportation. Jeremy Wilson demonstrated how  “the 
communications revolution” (especially the introduction of radio television and an 
improved highway system)  had contributed to a decline in  electoral localism between 
1903 and 1975, as measured by increased swing uniformity.62 The spread of cable and 
satellite facilities throughout the interior in the 1970s and 1980s, followed by the 
establishment of the internet in the 1990s and 2000s, have undoubtedly accentuated this 
context-broadening trend, bringing global as well as provincial and national mass media 
into practically every home. But the sheer quantity and variety of news sources and 
cultural influences  would have also likely undermined any “one-step flow” of 
information about provincial politics that could be directly controlled by the provincial 
government.  Second, there has been an equally impressive “proliferation and 
institutionalization of interest groups” constituting  precisely the kind of  dense thicket of 
mediating influences that Sproule-Jones argued was conspicuously lacking in British 
                                                 
62 R. Jeremy Wilson,  “The Impact of Communications Developments on British Columbia  Electoral 
Patterns, 1903-1975,” Canadian Journal of Political Science 14:509-536 (1980). 
 
 28
Columbia in the early and mid-twentieth century.63 Third, the relationships of state and 
interest group actors with each other and with individual citizens are increasingly 
governed by legal rules, rights, norms and procedures, which  (although arguably 
constituting and reinforcing an ideological influence in its own right) constrain the 
coordinative discourse among policy actors and the communicative discourse between 
political actors and the public.  Some of these norms have powerful enabled hitherto 
marginalized groups by giving them symbolic capital (rights of recognition) that could be 
drawn upon in demanding political influence. 
 
A Note on Post-Materialism  
 
Over  three decades ago, Ronald Inglehart, a Political Scientist at the University of 
Michigan, also associated with the University of Geneva in Switzerland, first proposed a 
theory of value change that predicted value priorities in advanced industrial societies 
would tend to shift away from “Materialist” concerns about economic and physical 
security, toward a greater emphasis on freedom, self-expression, and the quality of life, or 
“Post-Materialist” values. This was basically a theory of intergenerational value change 
based on two key hypotheses, as set out in Inglehart’s 1977 book the Silent Revolution64: 
(1) a Scarcity Hypothesis, which postulates that individuals’ priorities reflect the 
socioeconomic environment by placing the greatest subjective value on those things that 
are in relatively short supply; and (2) a Socialization Hypothesis, which holds that there 
is a substantial time lag between socioeconomic environment and value priorities since, 
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to a large extent, one’s basic values reflect the conditions that prevailed during one’s 
preadult years. Taken together, these two hypotheses generate a clear set of predictions 
concerning value change: conditions of prosperity lead to a fundamental, but very gradual 
shift in which needs for belonging, esteem, intellectual and aesthetic satisfaction, and a 
cleaner environment become more prominent, as a younger generation replaces an older 
one. 
     Thus Inglehart in the Silent Revolution found that an emerging emphasis on quality of 
life issues was being superimposed on the older, class-based cleavages of industrial 
society.65 His later books Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Society66 and 
Modernization and Postmodernization: Cultural, Economic, and Political Change in 43 
Societies67 not only use the cumulative results of the massive World Values Survey to 
empirically confirm these theoretical expectations, but also situate this value shift in a 
much broader historical process of postmodernization: hence the core societal project of 
traditional societies is survival; in modern societies maximized economic growth; and in 
postmodern societies maximized subjective well-being. At the individual level, individual 
achievement defined in material terms is the primary value in modern societies, only to 
be supplanted by postmaterialist and postmodern values of well-being. Furthermore, a  
growing emphasis on individual freedom leads to not only a rejection of traditional 
authority that is characteristic of processes of modernisation, but an erosion of the 
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rational-legal institutional authority that is often seen as the hallmark of political 
modernization. At all of these levels, the root cause of the Postmodern value shift has 
been the gradual withering away of values systems that emerged under conditions of 
scarcity, and the spread of security values among a growing segment of the population.68 
     However, the question of post-materialism and inter-generational value shift, and how 
it cuts across both class-based and populist analyses, did not begin to be seriously 
considered in the B.C. context until the 1990s, no doubt in response to the volume of 
theoretical and comparative post-materialist literature, but also because of the 
transformation of the B.C. party system in the 1991 provincial election, which was 
associated with the assumption by a large number of baby-boomers of positions of 
leadership.  Indeed, one could have given a fairly compelling account in the early 1990s  
of how the new party system and policy agenda  was a straightforward manifestation of 
intergenerational value change as predicted by Inglehart and Nevitte. A look at the 
Parliamentary Guide for the years 1990 through 1993 shows clearly how in the  Vander 
Zalm and Johnston government the majority of cabinet including the premier were born 
before 1940, while in the Harcourt cabinet the majority, including the premier, were born 
after 1940.  It is easy to attribute large parts of the Harcourt government’s agenda to the 
postmaterialist attitudes of the baby-boom generation: the importance of women’s issues; 
and the importance of the environment reflected in the creation of new parks, cancellation 
of Kemano II and a new forest practices code; recognition of cognitive mobilization of an 
educated citizenry’s new demands for participation and involvement was reflected in the 
significant new mechanisms for consultation represented by the CORE process, land use 
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plans, the Economic Summits, the Treaty process, Freedom of Information legislation, 
and so on. While these value preferences had gradually increased in salience under the 
Socreds, in keeping with the gradualness of change implied by the Socialization 
Hypothesis, the sudden appearance of a new-look party system in 1991 largely dominated 
by the postwar cohort pushed them, quite predictably, to the top of the policy agenda.   
     Nevertheless,  postmaterialism has proven to be  but one current in public opinion, 
albeit a significant  one. Donald Blake in 1995 used survey data on three dimensions–
populism, neoconservatism and postmaterialism–and concluded that populism and the 
clash between left-wing and right-wing political philosophies still structure the political 
orientations of the electorate. He observed that although the importance of 
postmaterialism and “New Politics” were increasing, that trend may have been blunted by 
the greater priority accorded to traditional materialist values such as law and order and 
economic security by the province’s Asian ethnic minority, especially given the large 
component of immigrants from newly-industrialized countries in that group. 
.   More recent studies generally confirm the conclusion that New Politics has not been 
structuring either the party system or the policy agenda in a dominant or determinative 
fashion.  Erickson suggests that the  Liberals may have made some inroads among 
postmaterialist voters due to Campbell’s climate change initiatives, while the NDP (as the 
opposition party) has made gains among those with populist sentiments.69  The 
traditional antinomy between labour and capital has been supplemented by conflicts 
between economic and environmental interests that are more pronounced on the south 
coast of British Columbia than perhaps anywhere else in Canada; but postmaterialist 
politics are only one aspect of  the province’s  political distinctiveness.   
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     Equally important,  from an institutionalist perspective and from the perspective of 
Cairns’s Citizens’ Constitution theory particularly, is that proceduralism, legalism and 
rights norms deserve a separate analytical emphasis, and should probably not be seen as 
mere outgrowths of economic prosperity or physical security.70 The willingness of 
insecure or marginalized groups to support political and institutional change has been an 
important motif in B.C.’s political history,  but the the veritable explosion in the number 
and variety of demands for recognition during the past three decades has undoubtedly 
been fuelled in part by the  symbolic resources that the Charter of Rights has afforded to 
individual citizens and minority groups seeking to make claims. The  failure to 
understand a citizenry who are suddenly much more likely to demand a voice in, and 
assert their rights against, institutional authorities, has caused several Canadian 
politicians to be caught off guard, and may have caused a couple of  ill-starred B.C. 
premiers to underestimate the hazards of populist politicking in the late twentieth century. 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
The depleting explanatory legacies of  the classic theories reveal some crucial common 
threads and important clues for understanding the modern trajectory of B.C.’s 
institutional development.  One is the reliance  that the class-based, ‘exploitation’ and 
‘sponsored conceptual ideology’  theories all placed on  the comparative simplicity of 
social structures and patterns of interest group activity, particularly at crucial formative  
periods in the province’s history.  A later period of colonial settlement  than eastern 
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Canada  and a constant stream of newcomers, combined with a  very different political 
economy from that of the prairies, provided room for heightened agency on the parts of 
business corporations, organized labour and/or the state to shape and at times dominate 
the province’s political discourse.  In the late twentieth century, growing social pluralism 
and complexity—as evidenced by  the kind and number of interest groups and 
organizations, the development of the service economy, changing ethnic composition of 
the population, the linkage by improved communications and transportation to the outside 
world, and the addition of a new postmaterialist dimension to public opinion---has 
partially eroded and greatly altered  all of the major theorized conditions of B.C.’s 
distinctive political culture and party system. Yet problems remain: why does the tilted 
pendulum (left-right polarization with right-wing predominance) still persist? Is that 
persistence merely inertial and destined to fade? 
     Some possible answers lie in  the importance of  temporal ordering (timing and 
sequence) of  historical events and processes. Although  Robin stressed how a 
conjunction of factors had facilitated the creation of radical political organization, and 
Black also discussed how the late development of the party system and the shallow roots 
of local tradition made for activist, populist and materialist politics, the twin processes of 
pluralism and increased institutionalization are diminishing the importance of these 
factors over time.  Nevertheless, the ‘lateness’ of the Treaty Process ----the formal 
negotiation of  most B.C. First Nations’ terms of  integration with the Canadian state 
coming only after modernization, urbanization, the institution of constitutional  rights and 
the development of  resource economies on the land base—is an example of a sequencing 
of events that is unique in Canada and is of growing significance.  A new wave of 
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immigrant population with a highly materialist orientation represents a great continuity 
with B.C.’s past, but the independence of that phenomenon  from (still important) 
resource exploitation, and  its coincidence with strong post-materialist and rights 
orientations in the political culture,  represents a new conjuncture  with uncertain and 
possibly polarizing implications.  B.C. is not necessarily losing its capacity for political 
novelty or excitement. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
